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Preface
This article is written on behalf of those children who have been,
and will be, victims of the law of relocation as it is frequently ap-
plied in New York by well-meaning judges who often find them-
selves constrained by precedent to render custody determinations
that disregard the well being of children. The long recognized
fundamental truth that "the only absolute in the law governing
custody is that there are no absolutes,"' has been ignored in many
relocation cases which have resulted in custody determinations
where the best interest of the child is not even reached, since the
* Associate Justice, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Judicial
Department, 1990 to present. Former Justice of the Supreme Court, Ninth Judi-
cial District, and Judge of the Family Court, Westchester County.
The author credits the outstanding dedication and assistance of Robin Lamont
and Monique Thoresz, Pace University School of Law Class of 1995, as well as that
of Helene Rothman, Esq., and especially that of her confidential law clerk, Glenn
E. Simpson, Esq. Without their contributions, this article could not have been
written.
1. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767, 447
N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982).
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rigid threshold consideration of "exceptional circumstances" has
not been overcome.
I. Introduction
In its most elemental form, a relocation case is a custody
case that arises from a custodial parent's desire to move, with
the children, to a new home, away from the former marital dom-
icile and the noncustodial parent. A custodial parent may seek
advance permission to relocate, or, after an unauthorized move
away, seek the court's approval nunc pro tunc.2 A noncustodial
parent may seek to enjoin the move by the custodial parent or
force their return after the fact.3 Whatever the circumstances
under which they may arise, relocation cases are among the
most difficult for a court's determination. The results may be
devastating for a noncustodial parent who is faced with the loss
of convenient visitation. They may be even more traumatizing
for the custodial parent who is forced to return or lose custody
altogether. They may be most draconian for a child who is torn
from the steady care of his or her custodial parent, only to land
in the care of the former noncustodial parent, without adequate
consideration of whether the custody change is in the child's
best interest.4
The New York Court of Appeals has spoken only rarely on
the guidelines to be used in considering relocation cases. In
Weiss v. Weiss 5 and Daghir v. Daghir,6 the court developed a
two-part test to be applied when a custodial parent petitions for
relocation: first, the custodial parent must demonstrate "excep-
2. The term means "a phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after the time
when they should be done, with a retroactive effect." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY
1069 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See infra part IV.
4. See the dissent of Judge Meyer in Daghir v. Daghir, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 944,
439 N.E.2d 324, 328, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612 (1982) (Meyer, J., dissenting)
("[Clustody should not be changed to punish one parent or enforce the rights of the
other but only when it has been shown to be in the child's best interests to do so.").
Yet, in Judge Meyer's opinion, that is just what the majority did in Daghir.
5. 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
6. 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982).
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tional circumstances" 7 necessitating the move, and second, the
move must be in "the best interests of the child.""
Since Weiss and Daghir, the Court of Appeals has not writ-
ten an opinion in a relocation case, 9 leaving the task of inter-
preting these amorphous terms to the lower courts. As one
might expect, the wide range of interpretations of both parts of
this test has made for a somewhat speckled history. Lacking
guidance from the Court of Appeals, the appellate divisions
have struggled with the meaning of these terms and, as will be
more fully developed herein, have in many instances lost sight
of the focal point of the analysis: "the best interest" of the
children. 10
The current state of the law governing relocation cases in
New York is confused and inconsistent, and frequently the deci-
sions are irreconcilable. The law fails to serve the best interests
of children, the parties, or the system. It provides virtually no
guidance to the public, the bar, or the bench, and thereby pro-
vides fertile grounds for protracted litigation, which clearly
serves the legitimate interests of no one. Appellate review and
reversal frequently follow." The decisions of the four appellate
divisions are often in conflict' 2 and frequently, so too are the
holdings within each department. Although the law as applied
ostensibly intends to promote the best interests of the children,
because of the courts' preoccupation with the application of
7. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 175, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865. See infra
part III.A. It should be noted that the exceptional circumstances test was appar-
ently first announced by then-Justice Titone in Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571,
574, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (2d Dep't 1979), which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980).
8. See Daghir, 56 N.Y.2d at 940, 439 N.E.2d at 325, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 609. See
also infra part III.A.
9. In between Weiss and Daghir, the Court of Appeals considered Priebe v.
Priebe, 55 N.Y.2d 997,434 N.E.2d 708,449 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1982) (mem.). However,
Priebe adds nothing to the two-part analysis set forth in the above two cases. Ad-
ditionally, Martinez v. Konczewski, 57 N.Y.2d 809, 441 N.E.2d 1117, 455 N.Y.S.2d
599 (1982), was decided after Daghir, but it affirmed on the opinion of the Appel-
late Division.
10. Indeed, in his dissent in Daghir, Judge Meyer recognized the need for the
Court of Appeals to formulate comprehensive "guidelines" to steer the lower courts
through the "difficult choices involved" in relocation cases. 56 N.Y.2d at 949, 439
N.E.2d at 330-31, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 615 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
11. See infra note 272.
12. See infra note 271.
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static rules of law, what should be the paramount consideration
often times is relegated to secondary or even lesser importance.
The application of static thresholds 13 as prerequisites to a
genuine inquiry into the true best interests of children 4 often
impedes the ability of the courts to reach equitable solutions in
cases where at least one party is going to get less than the de-
sired result. In our modern American society, routinely one-
half of all first marriages end in divorce. 15 Children are born to
unmarried parents whose relationships may be even more tran-
sitory.' 6 More mothers choose to or must enter the work force.
Ours is a mobile society and career demands often require relo-
cations. This reality becomes even more pressing when com-
bined with the hard facts that remarriages to spouses with
established careers may further increase the need to relocate.' 7
In short, a law which fails to recognize these and other real con-
cerns that can motivate a parent's need to move away from the
former marital domicile should be revisited. Divorce is destabi-
lizing to families. In an ideal world there would be no divorces.
This is not an ideal world and judges should not be blind to the
reality of the actual circumstances of the cases they decide: pre-
tending that the family is still intact and that geographic prox-
imity is always preferable. This is not always the case.
Part II of this article will discuss the origins of relocation
law in New York, examining the landmark cases which set the
stage for the law as we know it. Part III will explore the case
law that has developed over the past decade or so, paying par-
ticular attention to the factors which have been held to consti-
tute exceptional circumstances to permit relocation of the
13. If exceptional circumstances are not shown, the issue of whether or not
the move is or will be in the children's best interests is not reached. Radford v.
Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 100, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 972-73 (2d Dep't 1993). See infra
text accompanying note 20; see also infra parts II.B, III.B, IV.
14. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 174, 418 N.E.2d at 379-80, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (stat-
ing that other courts' references to visitation as a "natural parental right ... ig-
nore[ ] the primacy of the child's welfare").
15. See Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y &
L. 383, 390 (1994).
16. See Kimberly P. Carr, Comment, Allison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting The
Best Interests of the Child in a Non-Traditional Family, 58 BROOK L. REv. 1021,
1021 & n.1 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169 A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't
1991).
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custodial parent. Part IV will critique the law of New York,
highlighting the inconsistencies and troubling aspects of the
law as applied. My analysis will illustrate my conclusion that
New York courts are not giving proper consideration to the
"best interests of the child" factor, and that when courts do ac-
tively consider best interests, it is often secondary to the other
parts of the relocation test. Part V will examine the relocation
law of other jurisdictions, providing a measure for comparison
and enabling the reader to appreciate the benefits of the test we
shall propose. Finally, Part VI will recommend a different ap-
proach to determining relocation cases in New York.
II. Background
Prevailing norms governing custody disputes have changed
with the development of the common law. The law has evolved
from seeing feudal fathers regularly receive custody of their
children as chattel, to children of tender years customarily be-
ing placed in the care of their mother. 18 Today the law purports
to respect the primacy of the best interests of the child.' 9 Unfor-
tunately, because in relocation cases best interests are not con-
sidered until after the exceptional circumstances threshold is
crossed,20 custody and relocation issues are often decided, with
potentially dire consequences, without regard to the best inter-
ests of the children involved. To understand this anomalous sit-
uation, let us now turn to the Court of Appeals decisions which
established the law as we know it today.
A. The Two-Step Test
In Weiss v. Weiss,21 the Court of Appeals' first full opinion
on relocation, the Court considered whether a custodial mother
should be permitted to relocate with her son from Westchester
County, New York to Las Vegas, Nevada. 22 The parties had di-
18. For a concise discussion of the changing standards and the development of
the law of child custody, see generally 4 HENRY H. FOSTER, JR., ET AL., LAW AND
THE FAMILY NEW YoRK §§ 1:1-1:4 (2d ed. 1989).
19. See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 451 N.Y.S.2d
658 (1982).
20. See Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 100, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 972-73 (2d
Dep't 1993); see also discussion infra part II.B.
21. 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
22. Id. at 173, 418 N.E.2d at 379, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
1995] 343
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vorced in 1975 when the child was six, the divorce decree incor-
porating a separation agreement in which the mother was given
custody.23 While not detailed in the agreement, the record
showed that the father had enjoyed liberal visitation rights, see-
ing his son approximately 150-200 days out of the year.24 In
1980 the mother indicated that she wished to relocate to Las
Vegas, Nevada, stating a desire to "make a new life" for her-
self.25 The father opposed the move, and sought to enjoin his
former wife from relocating.26 After a hearing, the supreme
court denied the father's application for an injunction. 27 The
Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed.28 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate divi-
sion, focusing on the detrimental effect such a move would have
on the father's relationship with the child. 29 The court also
noted that the mother was not pursuing a unique, or even a par-
ticular job offer; it echoed the appellate division's statement
that "her search is for no more than an 'opportunity.' "30 Signifi-
cantly, there was no suggestion that the move was motivated to
force a separation of the son from his father.31 Finally, the court
stated that "absent exceptional circumstances ... appropriate
provision for visitation or other access by the noncustodial par-
ent follows almost as a matter of law."3 2
23. Id. at 172, 418 N.E.2d at 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
24. Id. at 176, 418 N.E.2d at 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
25. Id. at 172, 418 N.E.2d at 378, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Weiss v. Weiss, 76 A.D.2d 863, 863-64, 428 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (2d Dep't
1980).
29. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 176, 418 N.E.2d at 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866. The
court stated:
Gainsaying the expense of travel across the country, given the unavailabil-
ity of batches of time for making longer trips and the large gaps that will
intervene between meetings of father and son, it cannot be said that pater-
nal input, if not the quality of the filial relationship itself, will not suffer.
Id. at 176, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865-66.
30. Id. at 177, 418 N.E.2d at 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (citing Weiss, 76 A.D.2d
at 864, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 507).
31. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 176, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
32. Id. at 175, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865. Interestingly, in this
case, the mother had voluntarily agreed that the father's visitation rights, while
less frequent, would be longer in duration. Id. at 176, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436
N.Y.S.2d at 865. The Court was unmoved, however, stating that, "such a trade off,
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6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/1
BEST INTERESTS
One year later, in Daghir v. Daghir,3 the Court of Appeals
again had the opportunity to consider the issue of relocation. In
Daghir, the new husband of the custodial mother had been
transferred to France for two years, and the mother wished to.
accompany him with her three children.34 The children's father
sought to restrain the move, and in the alternative, requested
custody while the mother was in France.35 The family court
permitted the mother to relocate with the children, noting the
temporary nature of the move and finding that although the fre-
quency of the father's visitation would be reduced, an accommo-
dation could be reached by increasing the length of visits and
reducing the child support so that he could travel to France.36
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed;37
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate ruling, prohib-
iting the removal of the children from New York and awarding
custody to the father during the mother's absence. 38 The Court
of Appeals' one-paragraph majority opinion stated that the best
interests of the child is "the legally dispositive issue."39 The
court found that the family court had erred as' a matter of law
by basing its decision "only on a balancing of the interests of the
husband and the wife without making any determination as to
the best interests of the children."40 However, the court quali-
fied this statement by noting that this case was not a "classic
custody case in which we are often called on to choose between
whether voluntarily offered or judicially imposed, does not necessarily meet the
needs of the child or father." Id.
33. 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982).
34. Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 192, 44i N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (2d Dep't
1981).
35. Daghir, 56 N.Y.2d at 941, 439 N.E.2d at 326, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
36. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d at 193, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 495-96. The Family Court may
also have looked at the judgment of divorce which was awarded to the plaintiff wife
by reason of the cruel and inhuman treatment by her husband. The judgment also
included findings that the father had left his wife and children in 1974 and lived in
Lebanon for a period of 18 days. Daghir, 56 N.Y.2d at 941, 439 N.E.2d at 326, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 610. There had also been much disagreement over the children's reli-
gious upbringing, and the father had threatened to move to Lebanon and take the
children with him. Id. at 942, 439 N.E.2d at 326, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 610. Further, it
was found at the time of divorce that the husband was unable to properly take care
of the children because of his fill-time work schedule. Id.
37. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d at 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
38. Daghir, 56 N.Y.2d at 940, 439 N.E.2d at 325, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
39. Id.
40. Id.
1995] 345
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differing factual assessments as to the best interests of the chil-
dren,"41 since the change of custody was "for the purpose of giv-
ing effect to the father's right of visitation."42
Judge Meyer, the sole dissenter, strongly disagreed with
the majority's conclusion, believing that it was error as a matter
of law for the appellate division to "conc[eive] that the custody
of a child can be changed 'for the purpose of giving effect to the
father's right of visitation' without consideration of any of the
many other factors involved in the determination of the child's
best interest."43 In my view, Judge Meyer's thoughtful dissent
is right on target.
While Weiss and Daghir are credited for introducing New
York's two-part relocation test, those thirteen-year-old pro-
nouncements of this State's highest court do not necessarily re-
quire the rigid application of that test adopted by the courts
subsequently. A careful reading of Weiss expressly suggests a
more moderate approach, noting:
[T]he law does not insist that the parents make every possible
sacrifice no matter how disproportionate it may be to the benefit it
would bestow upon the child. The parents too are entitled to con-
sideration .... [Tihe quest, if possible, is for a reasonable accom-
modation of the rights and problems of both.44
Thus, the Court of Appeals in 1981 and 1982 apparently recog-
nized the legitimacy of considering a parent's right to a "fresh
start,"45 among other factors bearing on the child's best
interest.46
The most significant message contained in those cases is,
however, the court's clear unequivocal concern for the child's
welfare above all else. In Weiss, the Court of Appeals criticized
the concept of a "natural parental right" to visitation, as "too
narrow," since "it ignores the primacy of the child's welfare."
47
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 940-41, 439 N.E.2d at 326, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 610 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
44. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 176-77, 418 N.E.2d at 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
45. Contra Myrna Felder, Geographic Relocation Cases, N.Y. L.J., July 29,
1994, at 3, 4.
46. Similar sentiment was expressed generally in Daghir, 56 N.Y.2d at 940,
439 N.E.2d at 325, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
47. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 174, 418 N.E.2d at 379, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
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Moreover, the facts in Weiss reveal that the child's best in-
terest was not disserved by the court's denial of the move, since
in that case the child expressed his preference to remain in New
York with his father, the father had availed himself of frequent,
regular meaningful parenting time, and the mother's motiva-
tion to move to Nevada, while motivated in good faith by a de-
sire to make a "fresh start," was not justified by any specified
economic, educational, career, social, health, or familial advan-
tage.48 Even applying the more liberal approach which I will
recommend, 49 the move in Weiss would probably be disallowed,
since the father might well successfully contend that the child
would suffer emotionally from the removal, which appeared to
offer no significant benefit. Nevertheless, as applied by the ap-
pellate divisions, New York's relocation law leaves much to be
desired.
B. The Threshold Inquiry
When considering relocation cases, courts do not automati-
cally inquire whether the custodial parent has demonstrated
exceptional circumstances or whether the move is in the best
interests of the child. To the contrary, courts have consistently
held that underlying this two-part test is the fundamental ques-
tion of whether relocation would deprive the noncustodial par-
ent of "regular and meaningful access to the child."50 If there is
no deprivation, the custodial parent need not show exceptional
circumstances. The definition of "deprivation of meaningful and
regular access" is, however, far from clear or consistent, and ex-
isting case law provides little guidance even within the same
department. 51 However, if the court finds that the relocation
48. Id. at 177, 418 N.E.2d at 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
49. See infra part VI.
50. Lake v. Lake, 192 A.D.2d 751, 596 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1993); Schaefer
v. Brennan, 170 A.D.2d 879, 566 N.Y.S.2d 705 (3d Dep't 1991); Cassidy v. Kapur,
164 A.D.2d 513, 564 N.Y.S.2d 581 (3d Dep't 1991); Schouten v. Schouten, 155
A.D.2d 461, 462, 547 N.Y.S.2d 126, 128 (2d Dep't 1989); Blundell v. Blundell, 150
A.D.2d 321, 324, 540 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (2d Dep't 1989); Murphy v. Murphy, 145
A.D.2d 857, 858, 535 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845-46 (3d Dep't 1988); Zaleski v. Zaleski, 128
A.D.2d 865, 865-66, 513 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d
603, 512 N.E.2d 552, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1987); Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 808,
460 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (2d Dep't 1983).
51. See supra note 50. In some cases, the courts have permitted relocations
over greater distances predicated upon findings that the noncustodial parents' visi-
1995] 347
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will deprive the noncustodial parent of meaningful visitation, a
presumption arises that relocation is not in the best interest of
the child.52 The definition of deprivation of meaningful visita-
tion has depended as much upon the philosophy of the particu-
lar court as upon the mileage involved. 53
III. Judicial Interpretation of the Weiss-Daghir Test
A. The "Exceptional Circumstances" Prong
While in theory, the two-step analysis applied in relocation
cases purports to protect the rights of both parents and chil-
dren, it is not so easily applied. Courts are presented with in-
numerable considerations. Are relocations economically
necessary, or merely beneficial? Is relocation required as a re-
sult of the remarriage of the custodial spouse, or is there a need
for emotional support from friends and family, or the opportu-
nity for a "fresh start"? These factors, and others, in varying
combinations, represent the exceptional circumstances the
courts must consider in deciding relocation cases. Let us now
consider the categories into which these relocation factors fall.
1. Economic Betterment-The Desire to Make a "Fresh
Start"
Many proposed relocations are, in the custodial parent's
view, necessitated by economics. A new, higher paying job may
tation rights were not impaired by the relocation. Thus, in Lake v. Lake, 192
A.D.2d 751, 596 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1993), a relocation of 120 miles was held
not to interfere with the noncustodial father's ability to continue a close and mean-
ingful relationship with the child, while in Cassidy v. Kapur, 164 A.D.2d 513, 564
N.Y.S.2d 581 (3d Dep't 1991) and Murphy v. Murphy, 145 A.D.2d 857, 535
N.Y.S.2d 844 (3d Dep't 1988), similar conclusions were reached as to relocations of
190 and 340 miles respectively. In Schouten v. Schouten, 155 A.D.2d 461, 547
N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d Dep't 1989), the court held a 258 mile relocation not to constitute
a significant obstacle to the noncustodial parent's visitation rights; and in Smith v.
Finger, 187 A.D.2d 711, 590 N.Y.S.2d 301 (2d Dep't 1992), a similar determination
was made with regard to a relocation to a suburb of Washington, D.C. While each
of these cases turns on their own unique facts, it is conceptually difficult to recon-
cile such comparatively long distance relocations with, for example, Rybicki v.
Rybicki, 176 A.D.2d 867, 575 N.Y.S.2d 341 (2d Dep't 1991), where a relocation of
84 miles was enjoined.
52. Lake, 192 A.D.2d at 752, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 172; Lavelle v. Freeman, 181
A.D.2d 976, 977, 581 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (3d Dep't 1992); Hathaway v. Hathaway,
175 A.D.2d 336, 337, 572 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (3d Dep't 1991).
53. See infra note 271.
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be awaiting the custodial parent in a new locale with a lower
cost of and higher perceived standard of living. Or perhaps
there is the unsubstantiated hope that a change of scenery will
result in a better life. As the cases in the following two sections
demonstrate, the current exceptional circumstances test gener-
ally requires hard evidence of actual improvements anticipated
in advance of the move. Anything less generally will not suffice.
In Bonfiglio v. Bonfiglio,54 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, considered the custodial mother's application for
modification of visitation because she wished to relocate to Ten-
nessee. 55 The family court had granted the mother's applica-
tion, and the noncustodial father appealed. 56 On appeal, the
court found that the mother had "failed to demonstrate eco-
nomic necessity for the move." 57 The appellate division noted
that even though the mother's desire to relocate "appear[ed] to
be [based upon] a good faith desire to improve the lifestyle of
her family,"55 she had "neither a job nor permanent housing in
Tennessee and [was] not in danger of losing her job in New
York."59
The mother in Stec v. Levindofske60 shared joint custody
with the father, but was the primary physical custodian.61 The
supreme court granted her petition to allow removal with the
children to Ohio.62 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
reversed, holding that "the desire of the custodial parent and
her husband to change careers and to make a fresh start else-
where does not amount to an exceptional circumstance or press-
ing concern."63
54. 134 A.D.2d 426, 521 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2d Dep't 1987).
55. Id. at 426, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 428, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
58. Id. at 427, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
59. Id. at 428, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 50; see also Ellor v. Ellor, 145 A.D.2d 774, 775,
535 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644-45 (3d Dep't 1988) (denying permission for the custodial
mother to relocate to Ohio despite her claims that the relocation was based on
financial, employment, and medical reasons, where she did not attempt to seek
employment in New York before moving, had no job in Ohio, and did not show that
Ohio was more conducive for her or the child's health).
60. 153 A.D.2d 310, 550 N.Y.S.2d 966 (4th Dep't 1990).
61. Id. at 311, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 312, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 968. The Appellate Division, Fourth Depart-
ment, in Holsberg v. Shankman, 171 A.D.2d 1067, 569 N.Y.S.2d 44 (4th Dep't
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In Hathaway v. Hathaway,64 the mother, who was the pri-
mary custodian of the children under a joint custody order,
moved with the children to Virginia and then to Hawaii. 65 The
supreme court ordered the mother to return to New York within
sixty days. 66 When she failed to return, the court awarded cus-
tody of the children to the father and demanded that the chil-
dren be immediately returned to New York.67 The mother
appealed, claiming that "she had moved to Hawaii essentially
for better employment opportunities and because her family
was relocating there,.... and [because] she was dependent upon
her family for financial support."68 The Appellate Division,
Third Department, agreed with the Supreme Court's ruling
that the mother had failed to adequately show the existence of
exceptional circumstances. 69 The Appellate Division found that
the cost of living in Hawaii exceeded that which was previously
incurred 70 and, further, that "plaintiff moved to Hawaii at least
two months before the rest of her family with the only person
she apparently knew there being her boyfriend."71
The supreme court in Leslie v. Leslie72 allowed the custodial
mother to relocate to Virginia with the child of the marriage,
and the father appealed.7 3 The court found that the mother's
wish to move "was essentially predicated upon her desire to re-
turn to school"74 and her hope that the move would improve her
and the child's standard of living.75 Reversing the lower court,
the Appellate Division, Second Department, reiterated that "a
desire for economic betterment, as opposed to economic neces-
sity, does not constitute an exceptional circumstance sufficient
1991), cited its prior decision in Stec, wherein it held that a "custodial parent's
desire to start a new life in a distant location for her own personal happiness does
not constitute an exceptional circumstance or pressing concern warranting reloca-
tion of the children." Holsberg, 171 A.D.2d at 1067, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
64. 175 A.D.2d 336, 572 N.Y.S.2d 92 (3d Dep't 1991).
65. Id. at 337, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
66. Id. at 337, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 337-38, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
69. Id. at 338, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 180 A.D.2d 620, 579 N.Y.S.2d 164 (2d Dep't 1992).
73. Id. at 621, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
74. Id. at 622, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
75. Id.
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to justify a move that would significantly curtail visitation by
the child's noncustodial parent."7 6
In Lavelle v. Freeman,7 7 the Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, affirmed a family court order enjoining the custodial
mother from removing her six-year-old daughter to Missouri,
when her new husband was offered a promotion at the Missouri
branch of the company where he worked. 78 The appellate divi-
sion also affirmed the lower court's ruling that if the mother did
relocate, physical custody of the child would be awarded to the
father. 79 And while the appellate division emphasized at the
outset that the "primary consideration in any custody matter is
the best interest of the child,"80 in denying the move, the court
stated that "in situations such as the one herein involving em-
ployment-related relocations, the focus is on the nature of the
transfer, i.e., whether it simply affords the opportunity for eco-
nomic betterment or whether it is economically necessary."
81
In Atkin v. McDaniel,82 the mother and father shared joint
custody, the child's primary residence being with the father.
83
The mother moved to North Carolina and petitioned the court
for custody.8 4 The family court awarded the mother partial cus-
tody and the father appealed.8 5 In reversing the family court's
decision, the Appellate Division, Third Department, applied the
same standard to both the noncustodial and custodial parent,
stating: "We see no reason not to require a similar showing
where, as here, the noncustodial parent has relocated to a dis-
tant location and thereafter seeks custody of the children."86
The appellate division found that the mother "and her boyfriend
76. Id. (citing Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169 A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d
Dep't 1991); Bonfiglio v. Bonfiglio, 134 A.D.2d 426, 521 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2d Dep't
1987); Morgano v. Morgano, 119 A.D.2d 734, 501 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dep't 1986)).
77. 181 A.D.2d 976, 581 N.Y.S.2d 875 (3d Dep't 1992).
78. Id. at 976, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 977, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
82. 181 A.D.2d 188, 585 N.Y.S.2d 849 (3d Dep't 1992).
83. Id. at 189, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Farmer v. Dervay, 174 A.D.2d 857, 571 N.Y.2d 148 (3d Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 78 N.Y.2d 1041, 582 N.E.2d 593, 576 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1991)).
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decided to move to North Carolina to obtain better employ-
ment," and thus failed to show exceptional circumstances.8 7
The custodial mother in Sanders v. Sanders88 moved with
the children to Florida without notifying their father, and he
brought an action seeking the return of the children and, alter-
natively, a change in custody. 89 The supreme court ordered the
mother to return with the children or lose custody.90 The Appel-
late Division, Fourth Department, affirmed, 91 concluding that
the mother had not shown exceptional circumstances, since
"[tihere [was] nothing regarding either child that necessitated
relocation to Florida. Rather, defendant relocated seeking a
fresh start where her fiance was employed."92
In Clark v. Dunn,93 after being laid off from their jobs, the
mother and her new husband moved with the children to
Alaska 94 in violation of the judgment of divorce. 95 The noncus-
todial father appealed the Family Court order granting the
mother sole custody of the children.96 The Appellate Division,
Third Department, found that the new husband's "efforts to find
new employment were indeed meager[;]... [n]or [did] it appear
that the [mother] did any more to find employment."97 Thus,
the Appellate Division concluded that the mother had not
demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting the
move.
98
The mother in Blundell v. Blundell,99 wanting to move to
New Hampshire, appealed the supreme court's ruling condition-
ing her award of custody upon her remaining within a thirty
mile radius of the former marital home. 100 At trial, the mother
had testified that the motive for the move was to be close to her
87. Id.
88. 185 A.D.2d 716, 585 N.Y.S.2d 891 (4th Dep't 1992).
89. Id. at 717, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 718, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
92. Id.
93. 195 A.D.2d 811, 600 N.Y.S.2d 376 (3d Dep't 1993).
94. Id. at 813, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
95. Id. at 811-12, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
96. Id. at 812, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
97. Id. at 813, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
98. Id.
99. 150 A.D.2d 321, 540 N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dep't 1989).
100. Id. at 322, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
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family, who would provide free babysitting and emotional sup-
port, and because the cost of living would be reduced. 10 1 On ap-
peal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, found that
"the [mother's] desire to relocate to New Hampshire was not in-
tended to inhibit the [father's] reasonable access to the children
but was an attempt to seek a better living environment, eco-
nomic and otherwise, for her children, as well as herself." Tak-
ing this factor, together with the fact that the father was
"permitted to maintain reasonable access to his children," the
court concluded that, "upon a balancing of the equities of this
case, the [mother] should be permitted to move to New Hamp-
shire subject to liberal visitation by the [father]."0 2
2. Economic Necessity
The cases decided under this theory are generally distin-
guished from the "economic betterment" cases by more compel-
ling financial pressures which frequently will convince a court
to permit a relocation. The difference is one of degree. 10
3
In Klein v. Klein,10 4 the noncustodial father appealed the
supreme court's order granting custody to the mother and per-
mitting her to relocate to Chicago.10 5 On appeal, the mother
contended that the money the father offered would be insuffi-
cient to allow her and their child to maintain a residence in
New York City. 0 6 The Appellate Division, Second Department,
found that "in Chicago, however, [the mother] and the child
would be able to reside rent-free with her parents and two adult
brothers, who would assist her in caring for the child ... ."107
"Additionally, her family, friends and community would provide
her with the emotional support which she lacked in New
York." 108 For these reasons, the appellate division concluded
101. Id. at 322-23, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52.
102. Id. at 324, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
103. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 197 A.D.2d 771, 772, 602 N.Y.S.2d 953, 955 (3d
Dep't 1993) ("The emerging trend which justifies relocation requires proof that the
move is necessitated by economic necessity rather than economic betterment or
mere economic advantage.").
104. 93 A.D.2d 807, 460 N.Y.S.2d 607 (2d Dep't 1983).
105. Id. at 807, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
106. Id. at 808, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
107. Id.
108. Id. See also discussion infra part III.A.5.
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that the mother had shown exceptional circumstances and that
it was in the child's best interests to allow the move to
Chicago. 0 9
In Coniglio v. Coniglio,l l0 the custodial mother wished to
relocate to Florida with her son."' The mother had fled her
marriage to escape her husband's physical brutality, and she
was struggling to provide for her son on her minimal salary as a
nurse. 12 The husband had a history of chronic drug and alcohol
abuse, 113 and had little contact with his son for five years."14
The mother also believed that despite her ex-husband's treat-
ment for substance abuse, he was under the influence of drugs
during several visits with their son. 15 The mother's parents
were moving to Florida, and as she was reliant on them to
babysit for her son while she worked, she desired to move with
them.1 6 The Appellate Division, Second Department, stated
that the "predominant concern is the best interest of the
child,"117 but denied the move solely because the mother had
failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. 118
The supreme court in Goodwin v. Goodwin 1 9 granted the
custodial mother's petition to move with the children to Flor-
ida.120 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department
reversed, holding that there were no exceptional circumstances
warranting the move.' 2' The court reasoned that although the
wife "submitted proof indicating that she could not afford to
109. Klein, 93 A.D.2d at 808, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
110. 170 A.D.2d 477, 565 N.Y.S.2d 834 (2d Dep't 1991).
111. Id. at 478, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
112. Id. at 480, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Miller, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 479, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 836 (Miller, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 480, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Miller, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 479, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 836 (Miller, J., dissenting). The husband had
presented negative drug test results indicating he was not using drugs in April
1989, but as the dissent pointed out, this evidence was not dispositive of his status
for the other months when the mother believed him to be under the influence of
drugs. Id.
116. Id. at 480, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Miller, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 478, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
118. Id. I dissented from the majority's holding in Coniglio, believing that at
the least a hearing should have been held to determine whether exceptional cir-
cumstances existed. Id. at 481, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Miller, J., dissenting).
119. 173 A.D.2d 769, 570 N.Y.S.2d 637 (2d Dep't 1991).
120. Id. at 769, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
121. Id. at 769-70, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
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purchase a house in the area near the former marital residence,
.. the record was devoid of proof regarding the cost of renting a
house in the area."122 The court concluded that "upon the pres-
ent record, therefore,... the relocation to Florida [was not] eco-
nomically necessary." 123
In Rybicki v. Rybicki,124 the noncustodial father petitioned
the supreme court to enjoin the child's mother and her new hus-
band from relocating to Connecticut, and the mother cross-
moved for permission to move. 25 The mother claimed that
since her new husband was not a United States citizen, he had
great difficulty obtaining employment in the area where they
lived. 26 The supreme court denied the mother's petition. 27 On
appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed,
stating that the new husband's "commute to Connecticut from
Long Island, while tedious, would not be impossible." 12
The father in Wiles v. Wiles' 29 petitioned the family court to
enforce his visitation rights after the custodial mother informed
him that she intended to move to Florida with her new husband
and the parties' child. 30 The family court permitted the mother
to relocate.' 3' The father appealed and the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, reversed, reasoning that the mother's relo-
cation "was the result of her [new] husband's decision to accept
a job offer in Florida."132 The appellate division concluded that
"the relocation of the custodial parent to Florida with her new
spouse was not warranted by such exceptional circumstances as
would justify the undue interference with the [father's] visita-
tion rights with the child."' 33
122. Id. at 770, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
123. Id.
124. 176 A.D.2d 867, 575 N.Y.S.2d 341 (2d Dep't 1991).
125. Id. at 869, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 342-43.
126. Id. at 868-69, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
127. Id. at 867, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
128. Id. at 871, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
129. 171 A.D.2d 398, 578 N.Y.S.2d 292 (4th Dep't 1991).
130. Id. at 399, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
131. Id. at 398, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
132. Id. at 400, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
133. Id.
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In Hollington v. Cocchiola,34 the family court allowed the
custodial mother to move to California with the parties' child. 3 5
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, found
that the relocation was based on economic necessity, 136 since the
mother had made an adequate showing that the job market in
New York was depressed and she was having great difficulty
supporting herself and her child on whatever support the father
could provide. 137 At trial, the mother had established that she
had a permanent job waiting for her in California which paid
$1000 per month. 38 Additionally, a move to California would
allow her to live rent-free with her parents. 3 9 The appellate
division also emphasized that the custodial mother and the fa-
ther had never married, had never lived together with the child,
and it appeared that the father's relationship with his son "was
that of a mere visitor."140
In Ladizhensky v. Ladizhensky,14' the Appellate Division,
Second Department, held that the "totality of circumstances"
were "extraordinary" when the custodial mother moved to Kan-
sas City with her child. 42 The court reasoned that the mother's
desire to relocate "was not intended to inhibit the defendant's
reasonable access to his son." 43 Rather, the move was based on
"her new husband's job with the United States Department of
Agriculture located in Kansas City,.... her failure to find suita-
ble employment or an accredited chiropractic school in the New
York metropolitan area, and her good faith desire to improve
the quality of life for her child."1' Additionally, the court gave
great weight to the fact that the parents were divorced when
134. 180 A.D.2d 635, 579 N.Y.S.2d 700 (2d Dep't 1992).
135. Id. at 636, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
136. Id. at 637, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
137. Id. at 636-37, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
138. Id. at 637, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 184 A.D.2d 756, 585 N.Y.S.2d 771 (2d Dep't 1992).
142. Id. at 757, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 757, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 772-73. The court further noted that the de-
fendant had on a previous occasion consented to the plaintiff's move to Florida for
employment reasons, and was apparently "willing to permit his son to live out of
State with [his mother] at the time." Id. at 758, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
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their son was eighteen months old, and that the son had never
resided with his father except for visitation periods.' 45
Upon remarriage, the custodial mother in Elkus v. Elkus 46
applied to the supreme court for permission to move to Califor-
nia with the parties' two children. 47 The supreme court
granted the mother's petition and the father appealed. 148 The
Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, concluding that
the fact that "the mother's new husband resides in California
and cannot relocate and that the move will be advantageous to
[the mother's] career are insufficient, in the absence of a show-
ing of economic necessity or other exceptional circumstances to
justify relocation of the children."149
In Radford v. Propper,50 the custodial father wished to
relocate from Brooklyn to New Jersey, a distance of about fifty
miles.' 51 The court, having determined that the move would
disrupt the mother's regular and meaningful access to the
child, 52 then found that the father had failed to show excep-
tional circumstances which would justify the move.153 The court
stated that the father's proposed relocation to be near his and
his new wife's company in New Jersey was solely for their own
commuting convenience. 54 The court also described the fa-
ther's testimony that he would have increased purchasing
power and thus be able to provide the child with a better envi-
ronment as "self-serving," 55 and his move predicated on eco-
nomic betterment rather than economic necessity. 56
145. Id. at 757, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 773. The court cited Aberbach v. Aberbach,
33 N.Y.2d 592, 593, 301 N.E.2d 438, 439, 347 N.Y.S.2d 456, 456 (1973), wherein
the Court of Appeals cautioned courts to be reluctant to transfer custody of a young
child from the primary custodian who has cared for the child since birth. Cf La-
velle v. Freeman, 181 A.D.2d 976, 976, 581 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (3d Dep't 1992),
wherein the Third Department was not so reluctant to permit relocation, even
though the child had not resided with his father since birth.
146. 182 A.D.2d 45, 588 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep't 1992).
147. Id. at 47, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
148. Id. at 46, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
149. Id. at 49, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
150. 190 A.D.2d 93, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967 (2d Dep't 1993).
151. Id. at 94, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 969
152. Id. at 101, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Consequently, the court affirmed the family court's transfer of
custody to the mother. 157
The custodial mother in Atkinson v. Atkinson58 moved to
Florida with the children and her paramour, 59 but was ordered
by the family court to return with the children. 60 Upon her
failure to return, custody was awarded to the father.1 1 The Ap-
pellate Division, Third Department, in upholding the family
court's decision, stated that "[t]he emerging trend which justi-
fies relocation requires proof that the move is necessitated by
economic necessity rather than economic betterment or mere
economic advantage." 16 2 The appellate division agreed with the
family court's determination that "[tihere [was] no evidence of
economic necessity which would justify the relocation."163
In Lavane v. Lavane,64 the supreme court permitted the
mother to relocate with the children to Florida and the father
appealed. 65 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, concluded that the mother had proved the existence of
exceptional circumstances upon a showing that the mother's
employment opportunities in New York were limited, whereas
in Florida she could work at her uncle's insurance agency and
receive rent-free housing and free babysitting. 166 The court also
noted that the father did not spend substantial time with the
children.167
A mother's petition to relocate to Idaho with the children
was granted by the supreme court in Amato v. Amato.'68 On
appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, found that
during the marriage the family "led a transient lifestyle," 69 but
that in Idaho the mother "could be closer to her family and have
157. Id. at 103, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
158. 197 A.D.2d 771, 602 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d Dep't 1993).
159. Id. at 771, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 772, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
163. Id.
164. 201 A.D.2d 623, 608 N.Y.S.2d 475 (2d Dep't 1994).
165. Id. at 623, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
166. Id. at 624, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
167. Id.
168. 202 A.D.2d 458, 458, 609 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (2d Dep't 1994).
169. Id. at 459, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
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reduced living expenses." 170 Thus, the appellate division found
that the mother had shown economic necessity for the move. 1'7 1
In Raybin v. Raybin,'7 2 the father petitioned the family
court to allow him to move to Florida with the children and the
mother cross-petitioned to prevent the relocation.' 73 The family
court granted the father's petition and the mother appealed. 174
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed,
having determined that the father had made a "self-serving
claim,"175 and stated, "we cannot conclude that [the father's]
employment-related relocation rises to the level of economic
necessity." 76
3. Specific Job Opportunities
The burden of establishing exceptional circumstances is
frequently eased when a custodial parent can demonstrate a
specific employment opportunity awaiting that parent in the
proposed new domicile. When a new job is coupled with the loss
of former employment and the unavailability of comparable lo-
cal employment, economic necessity is more easily established.
However, the following cases demonstrate that absent a specific
job opportunity and a need to take advantage thereof, reloca-
tions are generally not permitted.
In Kozak v. Kozak,'77 the custodial mother accepted a pro-
motion that required her to move to Kentucky with the chil-
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 205 A.D.2d 918, 613 N.Y.S.2d 726 (3d Dep't 1994).
173. Id. at 919, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 921, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
176. Id. at 919, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 728. The father's position with IBM in New
York was being eliminated, and he was offered a position at the same rate of pay in
Florida. Id. at 920, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 727. In denying the father permission to relo-
cate to Florida with the child, the appellate division noted that the father had
"made no effort to secure other employment before accepting his company's offer to
transfer to Florida." Id. at 920-21, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 728. In addition, his "immedi-
ate acceptance of the transfer" was motivated by "company tenure and personal
preference . . . ." Id. The court stated, "[w]ere we to accept petitioner's relocation
without compelling proof of the need therefor, we would be sanctioning all employ-
ment-related transfers based upon nothing more than the perception that nonac-
ceptance will jeopardize a custodial parent's current income." Id.
177. 111 A.D.2d 842, 490 N.Y.S.2d.583 (2d Dep't 1985).
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dren.178 The father petitioned for a change of custody which
was dismissed and he appealed. 179 The Appellate Division, Sec-
ond Department, found that the mother's sole reason for the
move was her promotion and salary increase. o80 Having testi-
fied that she would not have lost her job if she remained in New
York and not accepted the promotion in Kentucky, the court
concluded that "the move was not a necessity for either [the
mother] or the children."' 81 The court awarded custody to the
father unless the mother, within ninety days, relocated with the
children to New York. 182
The mother in Morgano v. Morgano'83 moved to California
with the child and the father made a motion to the supreme
court for a change in custody.' 84 The supreme court granted the
father's motion and the mother appealed. 85 The Appellate Di-
vision, Second Department, found that "the sole basis for the
[mother's] move to California was to take advantage of a job op-
portunity which would substantially increase her salary and
fringe benefits while permitting her to work from her home." 8 6
The appellate division concluded that this was not economic ne-
cessity and thus, the mother had failed to show exceptional
circumstances. 8 7
In Kuzmicki v. Kuzmicki, 8 the custodial mother sought
permission to move with her child to California and the father
cross-moved to enjoin the removal and petitioned for custody. 8 9
The supreme court denied the mother's petition and she ap-
178. Id. at 842, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
179. Id. at 842-43, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
180. Id. at 843, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
181. Id. at 843-44, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
182. Id. at 842, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
183. 119 A.D.2d 734, 501 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dep't 1986).
184. Id. at 735, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
185. Id. at 734, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
186. Id. at 737, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
187. Id. While this case focuses on the fact of the mother's new job opportu-
nity, it might also be categorized as an "economic betterment" case. See supra part
III.A.1. The court, after discussing the mother's new job opportunity, concluded:
"While economic betterment is a factor which should be considered, it must be bal-
anced against the best interests of the child and the rights of the noncustodial
parent." Morgano, 119 A.D.2d at 737, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
188. 171 A.D.2d 843, 567 N.Y.S.2d 779 (2d Dep't 1991).
189. Id. at 843, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
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pealed.190 The Appellate Division, Second Department, af-
firmed, stating that "[w]hile the [custodial parent] has a home
with her mother and a job with her brother waiting for her out
in California, she has made minimal efforts to secure a job in
New York."191 The appellate division continued, "[iut is indeed
speculation, at best, as to whether the proposed move to Califor-
nia would add any stability and security to the mother's and
child's life."192
The family court in Wiles v. Wiles193 allowed the custodial
mother to move with her child to Florida, where her new hus-
band had accepted a job. 94 The father contested the ruling and
sought custody of their son. 195 The Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, reversed, stating that the family court had erred
in not considering the "best interests of the child as relevant to
a determination on the relocation issue." 9 6 The appellate divi-
sion remanded the case to family court for an immediate hear-
ing on the "fundamental issue of the best interests of the
child."197
In Lavelle v. Freeman,98 the father brought an action seek-
ing to enjoin the mother from relocating with the child and the
mother cross-moved for permission to relocate. 199 The family
court enjoined the mother's relocation and she appealed.200 In
affirming the family court, the Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, stated, "the proposed transfer of the [mother's] hus-
band is purely voluntary and involves only economic
betterment."201 The court further stated that where the impe-
tus for the relocation is employment related, "the focus is on the
190. Id.
191. Id. at 844, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 780-81.
192. Id. at 844, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
193. 171 A.D.2d 398, 578 N.Y.S.2d 292 (4th Dep't 1991).
194. Id. at 398-99, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
195. Id. at 399, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
196. Id. at 400, 578 N.Y.S. 2d at 294. The family court had held that the custo-
dial parent could relocate to Florida and ordered that custody remain with her
pending a further hearing as to the child's best interests. Id. at 399, 578 N.Y.S.2d
at 293.
197. Id. at 400, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
198. 181 A.D.2d 976, 581 N.Y.S.2d 875 (3d Dep't 1992).
199. Id. at 976, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 977, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
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nature of the transfer, i.e., whether it simply affords the oppor-
tunity for economic betterment or whether it is economically
necessary."20 2
4. Remarriage
Where relocation is necessitated by remarriage, the ten-
sions are among the greatest of any relocation cases. The custo-
dial parent and new spouse may find their very liberty tethered
by the noncustodial parent's visitation rights. A denial of relo-
cation due to remarriage forces a custodial parent to choose be-
tween the child and the new spouse. Remarriage alone is
generally not considered to be an exceptional circumstance, 20 3
but where the new spouse's employment is factored in, the
threshold may be crossed.
In LoBianco v. LoBianco,2 4 the mother had moved to Can-
ada with the child and married a Canadian citizen. 20 5 The fa-
ther sought a transfer of custody, which was granted.2°6 The
mother appealed, claiming that the "hearing court erred in fail-
ing to consider her remarriage and obligation thereunder to
relocate, as an exceptional circumstance warranting the change
of domicile of the child to the new location."20 7 The Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed, stating that "the best
interest of the child would more likely be effectuated by trans-
ferring her custody to the father."208 In this case, the court held
a best interest hearing assessing all relevant considerations
prior to transferring custody.20 9
In Richardson v. Howard,210 the mother petitioned for re-
moval with the children and the father sought to enjoin the
move. 211 The family court granted the mother's petition to relo-
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Cooper-Jones v. Williams, 162 A.D.2d 1001, 557 N.Y.S.2d 214
(4th Dep't 1990); Richardson v. Howard, 135 A.D.2d 1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th
Dep't 1987).
204. 131 A.D.2d 642, 516 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep't 1987).
205. Id. at 643, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 644, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
209. See id. at 643, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
210. 135 A.D.2d 1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1987).
211. Id. at 1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
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cate and the father appealed. 212 The Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, reversed, finding that no exceptional circum-
stances existed where the mother's "sole reason for wanting to
move to Michigan [was] to marry her fiance and move to his
home."
2 13
The mother in Cooper-Jones v. Williams 214 sought the
court's permission to relocate with the children.215 The supreme
court denied her petition and she appealed.2'6 The Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, affirmed, holding that "[t]he de-
sire of the custodial parent and his or her new spouse to reside
in a particular area does not, by itself, amount to an exceptional
circumstance or pressing concern justifying relocation of the
children and the consequential interference with the noncus-
todial parent's visitation rights."21 7
In Hemphill v. Hemphill,218 upon remarriage to a British
citizen, the mother wished to relocate with the children to
London. 219 When the father brought an action to enjoin the
move, the supreme court denied the father's petition and he ap-
pealed. 2 0 The Appellate Division, Second Department, upheld
the supreme court's conclusion that the mother's remarriage
constituted an exceptional circumstance since the new hus-
band's "business and livelihood depend[ed] upon his living and
working in England."221
In Cataldi v. Shaw,222 the father appealed the supreme
court's ruling that denied him a change in custody after the cus-
todial mother's remarriage and relocation to Alabama with
their children.223 The Appellate Division, Second Department,
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 162 A.D.2d 1001, 557 N.Y.S.2d 214 (4th Dep't 1990).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 169 A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 1991).
219. Id. at 30, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
220. Id. at 31, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
221. Id. at 32, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 691. For a discussion of international reloca-
tion considerations, see James Grayson, International Relocation, The Right to
Travel, and the Hague Convention: Additional Requirements for Custodial Par-
ents, 28 FAm. L.Q. 531 (Fall 1994).
222. 101 A.D.2d 823, 475 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't 1984).
223. Id. at 823, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 481-82.
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affirmed the denial of custody, stating, "a divorced parent does
not forfeit the right to remarry by accepting custody of his or
her children and that in proper circumstances the need to relo-
cate occasioned by the marriage of the custodial parent will not
necessitate a change in the custody arrangement."224 The ap-
pellate division found that the move was motivated by good
faith and was not orchestrated to deprive the noncustodial fa-
ther of access to his children.225 Finally, the court noted that
"relatives, who are located in Alabama, can provide the added
support, love, and guidance that only an extended family can
foster."226
5. Emotional Support
In Murphy v. Murphy,227 the supreme court denied the
mother's application to relocate to the Rochester, New York
area and she appealed.228 The Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, affirmed, reasoning that "[t]he evidence does not sup-
port any conclusion that [the mother's] need for contact with
and emotional support from her close friends in the Rochester
area rises to the level of a compelling circumstance." 229
Several other cases discuss the importance of "emotional
support" as a factor to be considered in determining whether
exceptional circumstances exist, even though the courts' hold-
ings are premised on other factors.230
6. Health Concerns
While not often used as a ground for demonstrating the
need to relocate, health concerns can, in appropriate circum-
stances, constitute a sufficient showing. In Deutsch v.
Deutsch,23x the Appellate Division, Second Department, af-
224. Id. (citations omitted).
225. Id. at 823, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
226. Id. at 824, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
227. 195 A.D.2d 794, 600 N.Y.S.2d 373 (3d Dep't 1993).
228. Id. at 794, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
229. Id. at 795, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 374 (citations omitted).
230. See, e.g., Amato v. Amato, 202 A.D.2d 458, 459, 609 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52-53
(2d Dep't 1994); Lavane v. Lavane, 201 A.D.2d 623, 624, 608 N.Y.S.2d 475,476 (2d
Dep't 1994); Cataldi v. Shaw, 101 A.D.2d 823, 475 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't 1984);
Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 808, 460 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (2d Dep't 1983).
231. 53 A.D.2d 861, 385 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d Dep't 1976), appeal denied, 40
N.Y.2d 808, 360 N.E.2d 1108, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1977).
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firmed the family court's grant of the custodial mother's petition
to relocate to Florida with the parties' son.232 The mother testi-
fied that she had undergone breast surgery, a hysterectomy for
"another mass," and had been "injured and hospitalized as a re-
sult of a major automobile accident."233 The appellate division
stated: "[t]he evidence clearly does not establish that her princi-
pal reason for removing to Florida was to flee her creditors, to
simply enjoy a vacation or to spite [the child's father]."2 4
7. Domestic Violence
Physical and emotional abuse by one parent of the other
has been held to constitute an exceptional circumstance justify-
ing relocation. In view of the New York courts' increased
awareness of and sensitivity to the prevalence and seriousness
of family violence in our society, it is likely that this factor will
be recognized with growing frequency.
In Sheridan v. Sheridan,235 the Appellate Division, Third
Department, affirmed the family court's determination that do-
mestic violence as well as economic necessity constituted an ex-
ceptional circumstance justifying the mother's removal with the
child to Puerto Rico, despite the fact that the relocation would
deprive the former husband of regular and meaningful visita-
tion.2 6 The appellate division noted that in Puerto Rico, the
mother could "ensure a stable home environment which is free
from domestic violence."23 7
In Jacoby v. Carter,238 the Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, affirmed the supreme court's denial of the father's pe-
tition for custody and injunctive relief, holding that the father's
physical and emotional abuse of the mother constituted excep-
tional circumstances warranting the mother's removal of her-
self and the child to Pennsylvania. 239 The court noted the
232. Id.
233. Id. at 862, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
234. Id.
235. 204 A.D.2d 771, 611 N.Y.S.2d 688 (3d Dep't 1994).
236. Id. at 773, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
237. Id. at 774, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 690; see also Giraldo v. Giraldo, 85 A.D.2d
164, 447 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1st Dep't 1982).
238. 167 A.D.2d 786, 563 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't 1990).
239. Id. at 787, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
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mother's testimony that she left without telling the father be-
cause he had threatened to hurt her if she were to leave.240
In Desmond v. Desmond,241 the court found the mother's ab-
rupt move to Virginia was justified by the physical, sexual, and
emotional abuse inflicted by the father, which constituted ex-
ceptional circumstances. 242 The court stated:
While this holding must be construed in light of the particular
facts herein, it is also intended to signal the acceptance by this
court of the view that severely and/or repeatedly abused parents
ought not to be penalized, in the context of a custody-visitation
case, for seeking refuge out of the easy reach of their
oppressors. 243
B. The "Best Interests" Prong
Once it has been determined that the custodial parent has
demonstrated the requisite exceptional circumstances to justify
the relocation, the focus then turns to whether the relocation is
in the child's best interests. Indeed, the courts in this state are
unanimous and unhesitating in the assertion that the best in-
terests of the child is the paramount concern.2 "
The analysis of whether or not a move is in the child's best
interests is similar to that employed in any custody case, with
the added factor that the relocating parent must demonstrate
how the relocation will positively impact upon the child. Thus,
the usual considerations such as parental fitness, continuity of
care, educational opportunities, the child's preference, the
child's physical, intellectual, emotional, and social well-being,
and continued contact with siblings remain factors, but are con-
240. Id.
241. 134 Misc. 2d 62, 509 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Family Ct. Dutchess County 1986)
(Marlow, J.).
242. Id. at 66, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 982-83.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Lavane v. Lavane, 201 A.D.2d 623, 623, 608 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476
(2d Dep't 1994); Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 808, 460 N.Y.S.2d 607,608 (2d Dep't
1993); Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 100, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 973 (2d Dep't
1993); Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 193, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (2d Dep't
1981).
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sidered in the context of whether the proposed move will have a
positive impact on the child.245
Obviously, when relocation to a distant domicile is factored
into the equation, no best interest analysis would be complete
without consideration of how the child will be affected by the
reduction in visitation with the noncustodial parent that fre-
quently follows. This requires a delicate balancing in its own
right. 246 Assuming that a custodial parent has demonstrated
exceptional circumstances justifying a move, a proposed other-
wise beneficial relocation may be denied due to the loss of the
close, nurturing relationship between the noncustodial parent
and the child.247 The move could be beneficial in all other re-
spects and still not be in the child's best interests.248 Con-
versely, exceptional circumstances warranting a relocation may
be demonstrated, and such a move may be in the child's best
interests notwithstanding a significant impact on visitation.249
Whether a given relocation will be in the best interests of a
child is a sui generis matter; each case turns on its own facts.
Assuming that a relocation is otherwise compatible with a
child's best interests, the focus is on, to the extent it is ever as-
certainable, just how the child's life will be affected by the posi-
tive attributes of permitting the move, balanced against the
losses the child may suffer as a result of the increased distance
from the noncustodial parent. Central to this inquiry is an
245. See, e.g., Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 172-73, 436 N.E.2d 1260,
1263-64, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 661-62 (1982) (parental fitness, continuity of care,
child's preference, child's physical, intellectual, and emotional well-being, and con-
tinued contact with siblings); In re Ebert, 38 N.Y.2d 700, 702-04, 346 N.E.2d 240,
241-43, 382 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473-75 (1976) (parental fitness, educational opportuni-
ties, child's preference, and continued contact with siblings); Koppenhoffer v. Kop-
penhoffer, 159 A.D.2d 113, 116-17, 558 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598-99 (2d Dep't 1990)
(educational opportunities, child's preference, and child's physical, intellectual,
emotional, and social well-being); Bistany v. Bistany, 66 A.D.2d 1026, 1026-27, 411
N.Y.S.2d 728, 729-30 (4th Dep't 1978) (child's preference, child's emotional well-
being, and continued contact with siblings).
246. See Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 98, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 971 (2d
Dep't 1993).
247. Id. at 100, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
248. Id. at 99, 597 N.Y.S.2d 971-72.
249. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169 A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d
Dep't 1991) (sanctioning a mother's relocation to England, where it was coupled
with lengthy visitation abroad by the father at the mother's expense). See also
Cataldi v. Shaw, 101 A.D.2d 823, 475 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't 1984) (sanctioning a
relocation to Alabama).
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* analysis of the quality and quantity of visitation enjoyed by the
noncustodial parent and child prior to the proposed move, 250
and whether the relationship can adequately be preserved at a
greater distance with less frequent, but more intensive pro-
longed visitation.251 Indeed, the rewards of a summer vacation
shared by a noncustodial parent and child may offset the loss of
weekly Wednesday evenings and alternating weekends; or they
may not. However, this is a factual issue that should be devel-
oped at a hearing with expert testimony. This is not an issue
which should be decided on the basis of a presumption that any-
thing less frequent than the extant local visitation schedule will
be inimical to the child's best interests.
Notwithstanding some decisions to the contrary,252 a custo-
dial parent's relocation without court permission, or even in vio-
lation of an injunction, should not result in a summary change
of custody to the "aggrieved" former noncustodial parent, with-
out determining that the change of custody is in the child's best
interests. 253 Indeed, in an excellent example of judicial re-
straint and foresight, the Fourth Department in Wodka v.
Wodka, 25 4 reversed a change of custody to a father due to a
mother's unlawful relocation to Oregon in violation of a court
order, because the family court did not consider whether the
change of custody was in the child's best interests. 255 Indeed,
the court noted that "defiance of a court order is but one factor
to be considered when determining the relative fitness of the
parties and what custody arrangement is in the child's best
interest."256
250. See, e.g., Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184 (2d Dep't
1979), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980).
251. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169 A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d
Dep't 1991); Cataldi v. Shaw, 101 A.D.2d 823, 475 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't 1984).
252. See, e.g., Kozak v. Kozak, 111 A.D.2d 842, 490 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d Dep't
1985); Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494 (2d Dep't 1981), aff'd, 56
N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982).
253. See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 94, 432 N.E.2d 765,
767-68, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895-96 (1982) (stating that "self-help through abduction
by the noncustodial parent must be deterred but even that 'must, when necessary,
be submerged to the paramount concern in all custody matters: the best interest of
the child. . .'") (quoting Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8, 401
N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (1977)).
254. 168 A.D.2d 1000, 565 N.Y.S.2d 353 (4th Dep't 1990).
255. Id. at 1000, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
256. Id at 1001, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
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While respect for court orders is critical to our system of
jurisprudence, a summary custody change without considera-
tion of whether such a change is in the child's best interests
cannot be permitted to stand. Such a reflexive sanction ignores
the primary concern and can have disastrous consequences for
the affected child. Obviously, a custodial parent's wrongdoing
should not be used to punish a child or to address the noncus-
todial parent's grievance. Rather, the high stakes attendant to
any relocation case necessitate a thoughtful, comprehensive
consideration of all relevant factors to ascertain whether the re-
location or a proposed change of custody will serve the child's
best interests.
IV. Critique of New York Relocation Law
It is important to recognize that relocation cases can arise
in one of several different contexts. First, a custodial parent
may seek court approval in advance of a relocation, giving the
court the greatest latitude to fashion an equitable remedy. In
such cases, the parties present evidence regarding their projec-
tions as to the need for the move and the consequences thereof,
and the court attempts to render a decision taking all relevant
factors into consideration. 257 Closely related are cases in which
the noncustodial parent, having been informed by the custodial
parent of a desire to relocate, seeks to enjoin the move in ad-
vance.258 Again, the focus is on what is likely to result from the
move.
At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which the cus-
todial parent has moved, without obtaining court permission,
and the noncustodial parent seeks to compel the custodial par-
257. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 195 A.D.2d 794, 600 N.Y.S.2d 373 (3d Dep't
1993); Kuzmicki v. Kuzmicki, 171 A.D.2d 843, 567 N.Y.S. 2d 779 (2d Dep't 1991);
Conglio v. Coniglio, 170 A.D.2d 477, 565 N.Y.S.2d 834 (2d Dep't 1991); Cooper-
Jones v. Williams, 162 A.D.2d 1001, 557 N.Y.S.2d 214 (4th Dep't 1990); Bonfiglio v.
Bonfiglio, 134 A.D.2d 426, 521 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2d Dep't 1987).
258. See, e.g., Lavelle v. Freeman, 181 A.D.2d 976, 581 N.Y.S.2d 875 (3d Dep't
1992); Rybicki v. Rybicki, 176 A.D.2d 867, 575 N.Y.S.2d 341 (2d Dep't 1991); Wiles,
171 A.D.2d 398, 578 N.Y.S.2d 292 (4th Dep't 1991); Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169
A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 1991); Richardson v. Howard, 135 A.D.2d
1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1987).
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ent to return with the children.259 In such "after the fact" cases,
the court may have the benefit of actual evidence of how the
move has impacted upon the children so that their best inter-
ests may be assessed with reference to concrete proof, as op-
posed to only future projections and probabilities. In very rare
instances, courts may sanction temporary relocations subject to
further proceedings at which the children's adjustment to their
new domiciles may be considered. 260 Finally, custodial parents
may seek "after the fact" permission sanctioning their prior un-
authorized relocation.261 It must be noted that any relocation in
violation of a court order or divorce judgment may have perilous
consequences such as contempt penalties and even a loss of cus-
tody if otherwise appropriate. 262
There is inherent in relocation cases an often irreconcilable
tension between the welfare of the child and the legitimate in-
terests of the custodial and noncustodial parent. The child's en-
titlement is, as I view it, to be raised in an environment which
maximally serves the child's emotional, intellectual, social, and
physical needs. The identification of that environment will re-
quire consideration of the totality of the circumstances which
surround the child's removal from the noncustodial parent, the
restraint of that removal, or most significantly, the reversal of
custody.
The custodial parent's legitimate interests may be in con-
flict with those of the child, where the move would benefit that
parent (and even the child) economically, socially or education-
ally, yet would still be detrimental to the child's overall best in-
259. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sanders, 185 A.D.2d 716, 585 N.Y.S.2d 891 (4th
Dep't 1992); Hathaway v. Hathaway, 175 A.D.2d 336, 572 N.Y.S.2d 92 (4th Dep't
1991). Sometimes the noncustodial parent may also seek to obtain custody of the
children, gaining leverage and raising the stakes of the controversy, whereas other
times, the noncustodial parent merely wants the children accessible for visitation
purposes-in effect holding the custodial parent hostage. See, e.g., Sanders v.
Sanders, 185 A.D.2d 716, 585 N.Y.S.2d 891 (4th Dep't 1992).
260. See, e.g., Libranti v. Libranti, 619 N.Y.S.2d 599 (2d Dep't 1994). But see
Wodka v. Wodka, 168 A.D.2d 1001, 565 N.Y.S.2d 353 (4th Dep't 1990); see also
supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wodka.
261. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 91 A.D.2d 628, 456 N.Y.S.2d 811 (2d
Dep't 1982).
262. See generally Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967 (2d
Dep't 1993); Ideman v. Ideman, 168 A.D.2d 565, N.Y.S.2d 353 (4th Dep't 1990);
Wodka v. Wodka, 168 A.D.2d 1000, 565 N.Y.S.2d 353 (4th Dep't 1990).
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terest in depriving the child of a closely bonded relationship
with the noncustodial parent, whose frequent consistent nur-
turing role is of overriding significance to that child.
Similarly, the noncustodial parent's resistance to the move
may be justified by a strong, positive relationship with the
child, which also satisfies the emotional needs of the parent.
Yet, effectively restraining the custodial parent's move or even
reversing custody may be traumatic to that child whose primary
attachment is to the custodial parent. From personal experi-
ence I can state without hesitation that these are the conflicting
interests that render relocation cases among the most gut-
wrenching to decide.
While New York courts pay lip service to doing that which
serves the best interests of the child, they commonly first con-
sider the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent.2 3 In fact,
Radford v. Propper cites the interference with the noncustodial
parent's visitation as a threshold that precedes inquiry into the
question of relocation. 264
It is noteworthy that in Weiss, the Court of Appeals found,
given the frequency of the visits between the noncustodial fa-
ther and his son, that "sparser" but longer visits would not suf-
fice to meet the child's needs. 26 5 However, while that may have
been true in Weiss, and may be true in other cases, we cannot
rationally conclude that a given relationship between a noncus-
todial parent and a child might not flourish with "sparser" but
longer periods of visitation over summers and other school vaca-
tions in all cases. During these periods of extended visitation,
the noncustodial parent may well assume the role of a de facto,
albeit temporary, custodian, enabling both parent and child to
explore new facets of their relationship. By placing undue em-
phasis on the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent, con-
venience becomes, in effect, the paramount consideration.
When one begins with the perspectives, however, that the fact
of a divorce necessarily must increase the familial inconven-
263. See Daghir v. Daghir, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453 N.Y.S.2d 609
(1982); Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967 (2d Dep't 1993); Ko-
zak v. Kozak, 111 A.D.2d 842, 490 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d Dep't 1985).
264. Radford, 190 A.D.2d at 94, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 969. This decision faithfully
digests many of the earlier cases and follows their precedent.
265. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 176, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865
(1981).
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ience of all concerned, and that extended but less frequent visits
may actually be preferable in a given case, the courts can focus
on what is truly best for the children involved.
As has been demonstrated thus far, there is an inherent
contradiction in all relocation cases which purport to be con-
cerned with the "primacy of the child's welfare,"266 yet which fail
even to reach this "predominant concern" 267 until after an ex-
traordinary circumstances threshold has been crossed. 268
Moreover, the current state of the law permits a noncus-
todial parent to exercise a complete veto over the custodial par-
ent's attempts to better the lives of the children and themselves
absent proof of extraordinary circumstances. 269 Although the
cases routinely cite the need to balance all relevant factors, 270
by creating a need for a threshold showing of extraordinary cir-
cumstances before the other relevant factors are even enter-
tained, obviously the scales are heavily tipped against the
relocation, regardless of its possible merits. Indeed this appli-
cation of the law creates, in effect, an irrebuttable presump-
tion 271 that continued, convenient, local visitation with the
266. Id. at 174, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
267. Ladizhensky v. Ladizhensky, 184 A.D.2d 756, 757, 585 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772
(2d Dep't 1992).
268. Radford, 190 A.D.2d at 99, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
269. See generally Katherine C. Sheehan, Post-Divorce Child Custody and
Family Relocation, 9 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 135 (1986).
270. Radford, 190 A.D.2d at 99, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 971-72; Coniglio v. Conigho,
170 A.D.2d 477, 478, 565 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (2d Dep't 1991).
271. The different appellate divisions treat the presumption differently. The
Third Department refers to a presumption that it is in the best interest of the child
not to be moved away from the noncustodial parent if visitation would be im-
pacted, but that this presumption may be rebutted by a showing of exceptional
circumstances by the custodial parent. See Raybin v. Raybin, 205 A.D.2d 918, 919-
20, 613 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (3d Dep't 1994) (summarizing the holdings in Lake v.
Lake, 192 A.D.2d 751, 596 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1993); Atkin v. McDaniel, 181
A.D.2d 188, 585 N.Y.S.2d 849 (3d Dep't 1992); and Hathaway v. Hathaway, 175
A.D.2d 336, 572 N.Y.S.2d 92 (3d Dep't 1991)). Yet, where a relocation will not
disrupt visitation by the noncustodial parent, the Third Department as well finds
the issue of exceptional circumstances to be irrelevant. See Murphy v. Murphy,
145 A.D.2d 857, 535 N.Y.S.2d 844 (3d Dep't 1988).
The First, Second, and Fourth Departments generally apply the exceptional
circumstances test as requiring a threshold showing of a pressing need for the relo-
cation before the issue of whether the move is in the child's best interests will be
considered. See Elkus v. Elkus, 182 A.D.2d 45, 588 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep't 1992);
Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967 (2d Dep't 1993), and cases
cited therein; Sanders v. Sanders, 185 A.D.2d 716, 585 N.Y.S.2d 891 (4th Dep't
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noncustodial parent is better for the child than permitting the
relocation.
The static threshold requirement of exceptional circum-
stances results in at least two anomalies. First, there is seem-
ingly a disproportionately high rate of reversals by the
Appellate Divisions in relocation cases. Trial level courts, see-
ing and hearing the witnesses first-hand, are inclined to fashion
equitable remedies to further the best interests of the children
without yielding to the irrebuttable presumption favoring con-
venient access by the noncustodial parent, while appellate
courts, reading sterile records, apply the exceptional circum-
stances test as a threshold to reverse orders permitting reloca-
tion, considering themselves constrained by precedent to
disregard the impact upon the children (absent exceptional cir-
cumstances).272 Indeed, we note few instances which illustrate
a trial level court order denying relocation having been reversed
to permit the move.273
1992); Wiles v. Wiles, 171 A.D.2d 398, 578 N.Y.S.2d 292 (4th Dep't 1991); Cooper-
Jones v. Williams, 162 A.D.2d 1001, 557 N.Y.S.2d 214 (4th Dep't 1990); Stec v.
Levindofske, 153 A.D.2d 310, 550 N.Y.S.2d 966 (4th Dep't 1990); Richardson v.
Howard, 135 A.D.2d 1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1987); Shed v. Sofia, 134
A.D.2d 894, 521 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (4th Dep't 1987); Kelly v. Kelly, 132 A.D.2d 977,
518 N.Y.S.2d 508 (4th Dep't 1987); Barie v. Faulkner, 115 A.D.2d 1003, 497
N.Y.S.2d 565 (4th Dep't 1985).
272. A brief glance at the cases cited in this article alone reveal an astounding
number of reversals at the appellate level. See, e.g., Raybin v. Raybin, 205 A.D.2d
918, 613 N.Y.S.2d 726 (3d Dep't 1994); Clark v. Dunn, 195 A.D.2d 811, 600
N.Y.S.2d 376 (3d Dep't 1993); Elkus v. Elkus, 182 A.D.2d 45, 588 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st
Dep't 1992); Leslie v. Leslie, 180 A.D.2d 620, 579 N.Y.S.2d 164 (2d Dep't 1992);
Wiles v. Wiles, 171 A.D.2d 398, 578 N.Y.S.2d 292 (4th Dep't 1991); Stec v.
Levindofske, 153 A.D.2d 310, 550 N.Y.S.2d 966 (4th Dep't 1990); Richardson v.
Howard, 135 A.D.2d 1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1987); Bonfiglio v. Bonfig-
lio, 134 A.D.2d 426, 521 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2d Dep't 1987); Kozak v. Kozak, 111 A.D.2d
842, 490 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d Dep't 1985).
273. In Blundell v. Blundell, 150 A.D.2d 321, 540 N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dep't
1989), the Supreme Court, Nassau County, directed the mother to return to within
a 30 mile radius of the former marital residence. Id. at 321, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, permitting a relocation to
New Hampshire, finding that the trip would not preclude visitation by the father.
Id. at 324, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53. See Ladizhensky v. Ladizhensky, 184 A.D.2d
756, 585 N.Y.S.2d 771 (2d Dep't 1992) (reversing an order denying relocation to
Missouri). See also Von Ohlen v. Von Ohlen, 178 A.D.2d 592, 577 N.Y.S.2d 662 (2d
Dep't 1991) (reversing an order denying relocation to Arkansas); A.F. v. N.F., 156
A.D.2d 750, 549 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2d Dep't 1989) (reversing an unwarranted custody
change and permitting relocation incident thereto).
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The second, more significant anomaly is that cases which
purport to be concerned with the best interests of the children
involved may actually be decided in a manner inconsistent with
the children's best interests.
The custodial parent's decision to move to a distant domi-
cile is generally one not undertaken lightly. Such a move inva-
riably entails significant expense, effort, and the adjustment of
the entire moving family. Genuine economic concerns are fre-
quent motivators, as are remarriages. Whatever precipitates
the decision to move, it will have an impact upon the family as a
whole.
When a custodial parent moves, only to be ordered to re-
turn by a court which has determined that the move was not
necessary, the psychological impact of such an occurrence may
be truly devastating for the child. As if the child is not bur-
dened enough by his or her parents' divorce, now the child is
responsible for the custodial parent's inability to move. Pioneer
visions of a new life are shattered and a child may see him or
herself as being the reason why everyone is made to suffer.
Even the most caring and supportive custodial parent would re-
act with resentment towards being told that the contemplated
move is prohibited. While the frustrated parent may focus re-
sentment upon an ex-spouse, or the court, the children may well
absorb a different message. It's their fault.
Of course it is not "their fault," but they may nevertheless
suffer. Furthermore, whether the move is made with court ap-
proval or without, an appellate court ordering a child's return
can likewise cause that child to suffer personal turmoil result-
ing from the responsibility inappropriately assumed for the
family's plight.274 The guilt which might plague such a child is
only one aspect of the trauma of a forced move back to the area
of the former marital domicile. The economic and educational
advantages that would have benefitted the custodial parent and
child may also be lost.
274. But see Frizzell v. Frizzell, 193 A.D.2d 861, 597 N.Y.S.2d 513 (3d Dep't
1993), wherein the Third Department, after two hearings and one prior appeal,
held that a court-sanctioned 1991 move was "a fait accomph," and that this fact
should have been considered by the supreme court. Id. at 862-63, 597 N.Y.S.2d at
514-15. Although there had been a prior appeal, Frizzell is technically another
case in which the appellate division reversed a trial court order denying permis-
sion to relocate. See supra note 273.
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The psychological impact upon a child "at fault" for the cus-
todial parent's inability to relocate is probably greatest in cases
where the custodial parent seeks to relocate as a consequence of
a remarriage. The current state of the law is that remarriage is
not an exceptional circumstance to justify a move if it will inter-
fere with the noncustodial parent's rights of visitation.276 How-
ever, it is arguable that no situation, in which permission to
relocate is denied, is more damaging to a child than being the
reason that his or her custodial parent is unable to live with a
new spouse, who may be unable to relocate near the residence of
the noncustodial parent.27 6 Such rulings hold the family of the
custodial parent hostage to the whims of the noncustodial par-
ent, based upon a presumption that it is better for the child that
the noncustodial parent to enjoy continued convenient access.277
The rationale underlying the exceptional circumstances
rule has been simply stated, and is grounded in the noncus-
todial parent's "right to reasonable and meaningful access to
the children [of] the marriage .. .. "278 "The term 'exceptional
circumstances' or 'exceptional reasons' is invariably associated
with a situation where either the exercise of such right is inimi-
cal to the welfare of the children or the parent has in some man-
ner fortified his or her right to such access."279 The rule that
has evolved is that unless visitation would be inimical to the
child, or the noncustodial parent has forfeited his or her rights,
that noncustodial parent possesses a natural right 280 to visita-
tion that is superior to, inter alia, the right of the custodial par-
ent to relocate. In the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
the noncustodial parent's right to reasonable visitation assumes
primacy over the child's right to have his or her best interests
fostered, furthered, and effectuated. Based upon the operation
275. Elkus, 182 A.D.2d at 48, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 140; Richardson v. Howard, 135
A.D.2d 1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1987); LoBianco v. LoBianco, 131 A.D.2d
642, 516 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep't 1987).
276. Cf Elkus, 182 A.D.2d at 48, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
277. Cf Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169 A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't
1991); Cataldi v. Shaw, 101 A.D.2d 823, 475 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't 1984).
278. Strahi v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 574, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186, (2d Dep't
1979), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980).
279. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d at 573, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 186 (citing Denberg v.
Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 986, 229 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1962)).
280. Id.
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of a presumption that the child's best interests will be served by
continued local visitation with the noncustodial parent, his or
her actual best interests may be thwarted and custody may be
changed.2 1
Clearly, the rights of a noncustodial parent are significant,
and a child will normally derive very genuine benefits from reg-
ular visitation with the noncustodial parent. However, each
case turns on its own facts and what is needed is flexibility
rather than strict applications of unyielding thresholds.
V. A Better Approach
The approach followed in New York represents just one
point of view in the analytical spectrum. Whereas New York
imposes tougher requirements upon a custodial parent seeking
to relocate, other states, such as Minnesota, take the opposite
approach to facilitate relocation. 282 Yet other states take a more
middle ground. Two states whose relocation policies are worthy
of discussion are New Jersey and Illinois.
A. New Jersey
The New Jersey standards for removal are based upon stat-
ute and case law. The New Jersey statute dealing with custo-
dial relocation is New Jersey Statutes section 9:2-2.283 The
purpose of this statutory provision is "to preserve the rights of
the noncustodial parent and the child to maintain and develop
their familial relationship."284 Under the statute, removal is
permitted only upon "cause shown."28 5 The "cause shown" has
been interpreted to encompass the "interest in continuing, by
281. In its simplest form, a relocation case is a custody case, since an unau-
thorized relocation can lead to a change in custody. See generally Radford v. Prop-
per, 190 A.D.2d 93, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967 (2d Dep't 1993). Cf Wodka v. Wodka, 168
A.D.2d 1000, 565 N.Y.S.2d 353 (4th Dep't 1990) (holding an automatic change of
custody to be improper).
282. For a concise comparative discussion of the relocation laws of several key
states, see Mandy S. Cohen, Note, A Toss of the Dice... The Gamble With Post-
Divorce Relocation Laws, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 127 (1989).
283. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 1993).
284. Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 855 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Cooper v.
Cooper, 491 A.2d 606, 610 (N.J. 1984)); see also Comas v. Comas, 608 A.2d 1005,
1007 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).
285. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2.
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appropriate visitation, as reasonable, healthy and affectionate a
relationship as possible with the parent with whom he does not
reside."286 Under case law, "the standard for allowing removal
is now primarily what is in the best interest of the children."287
New Jersey begins its analysis with the realistic acknowl-
edgement that divorce necessarily alters the former family unit
and that accommodations are necessary. The courts of New
Jersey look at what is in the best interest of the child in terms of
the new family unit. The new family unit consists of the custo-
dial parent and the children. The courts have recognized that
"[tihe family unity which is lost as a consequence of the divorce
is lost irrevocably, and there is no point in judicial insistence on
maintaining a wholly unrealistic simulation of unity."288
Indeed, the New Jersey approach reflects a pragmatic ac-
knowledgement absent in New York, that new familial relations
and dynamics must necessarily alter the family structure. Par-
ents may have new partners, employment opportunities may re-
quire relocation to new states, and the archetypal "Ozzie and
Harriet" family structure simply must give way to a new real-
ity. In this new reality, the rights of the noncustodial parent
are not to be disregarded; and depending upon the nature of the
relationship between the noncustodial parent and child, it may
well be in the child's best interest to disallow a relocation. The
New Jersey approach possesses a greater flexibility than does
the New York exceptional circumstances threshold standard.
As such, the New Jersey approach is better suited to reach an
appropriate disposition in each case.
In Cooper v. Cooper,28 9 the court held that the custodial par-
ent had to show that there would be a "real advantage" to him-
self or herself and the children by the relocation.290 The court in
Holder v. Polanski291 held that "the focus of the 'cause' require-
ment should not be on the benefits that will accrue to the custo-
286. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 29 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd,
365 A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
287. Winer v. Winer, 575 A.2d 518, 522 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (cit-
ing Holder, 544 A.2d at 855).
288. Cooper, 491 A.2d at 612 (quoting Helentjaris v. Sudano, 476 A.2d 828,
832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)).
289. 491 A.2d 606 (N.J. 1984).
290. Id. at 613.
291. 544 A.2d 852 (N.J. 1988).
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dial parent but on the best interests of the children and on the
preservation of their relationship with the noncustodial par-
ent."292 The court in Holder then stated that "from that per-
spective, the 'cause' requirement of [section 9:2-2] implicates
the best interests of the child as manifested through visitation
with the noncustodial parent."293 The Holder court then stated
that "[sihort of an adverse effect on the noncustodial parent's
visitation rights or other aspects of a child's best interests, the
custodial parent should enjoy the same freedom of movement as
the noncustodial parent."294
In readdressing the issue of removal in Holder, the court
modified the "cause" requirement of a "real advantage" from
Cooper, and held instead that "any sincere, good-faith reason
will suffice."295 Upon a satisfactory showing to the court that
there is a good faith reason for the move, the court then consid-
ers whether the move will be "inimical to the best interests of
the children or adversely affect the visitation rights of the non-
custodial parent."296 If the move requires substantial changes
in the visitation schedule, the court then considers several
factors.
The first factor the court considers is the advantages the
move may provide, including whether the move will improve the
quality of life for the child and the custodial parent.297 The sec-
ond factor is the motive of the custodial parent in deciding to
move and the motive of the noncustodial parent in opposing the
move. 298 If the motive of the custodial parent was to frustrate
or defeat the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent, then
removal will not be permitted.299 The third factor that the
292. Id. at 856.
293. Holder, 544 A.2d at 856 (citing Cooper, 491 A.2d at 610).
294. Id.
295. Id. The court noted that if the custodial parent's motive was to "thwart"
the noncustodial parent's visitation, the test would not be met. However, since the
custodial parent in Holder was motivated to move to be closer to relatives and to
make a "fresh start in life," this was sufficient to justify a move to Connecticut. Id.
See also McMahon v. McMahon, 607 A.2d 696, 698 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991);
Winer, 575 A.2d at 522; Harris v. Harris, 563 A.2d 64, 71-72 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1989).
296. Holder, 544 A.2d at 856; Harris, 563 A.2d at 72.
297. Cooper, 491 A.2d at 613.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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courts consider is whether there will be a realistic opportunity
for visitation which will maintain and foster the relationship
between the child and the noncustodial parent if removal is al-
lowed. 300 The court also looks to whether the custodial parent is
likely to comply with visitation orders when he or she is no
longer within the jurisdiction.301
The emphasis in looking at these factors is no longer on
"whether the children or the custodial parent will benefit from
the move, but on whether the child will suffer from it."302 The
Holder court further stated that "[m]otives are relevant, but if
the custodial parent is acting in good faith and not to frustrate
the noncustodial parent's visitation rights, that should suf-
fice."3 03 The Holder court stated that a critical. concern remains
that the noncustodial parent maintain a reasonable visitation
schedule, "but in our mobile society, it may be possible to honor
that schedule and still recognize the right of [the] custodial par-
ent to move." 30 4 Although the courts are mindful of the custo-
dial parent's right to move as well as the noncustodial parent's
right of visitation, the "beacon" concern remains the best inter-
ests of the child. 305  The New Jersey courts hold that the ad-
vantage of the proposed removal and the possibility for a better
lifestyle should not be sacrificed in order to preserve weekly vis-
itation by the noncustodial parent where there is a reasonable
alternative to visitation, "and where the advantages of the move
are substantial."306 Thus, once the initial burden of cause is
shown by the custodial parent, the burden is on the noncus-
300. Holder, 544 A.2d at 857; Cooper, 491 A.2d at 613; McMahon, 607 A.2d at
698.
301. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976),
aff'd, 365 A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
302. Holder, 544 A.2d at 857.
303. Id.
304. Id.; Winer, 575 A.2d at 524.
305. Holder, 544 A.2d at 857; McMahon, 607 A.2d at 698-99.
306. Cooper, 491 A.2d at 614; Harris v. Harris, 563 A.2d 65, 70 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1989); D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d at 30. In Harris, Mrs. Harris wanted to
move to Florida with the children, remarry, and begin a new life. Harris, 563 A.2d
at 70. The cost of living in New Jersey had become "exorbitant," and finances be-
came increasingly difficult. Id. The housing was cheaper in Florida, the state had
several schools which her gifted child could attend, and the climate would be bene-
ficial in controlling their other child's asthma. Id. at 70-71. The court here deter-
mined that there were several advantages in the move to Florida and the children
should not be deprived of an improved lifestyle, which would be in the children's
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todial parent to show that the proposed alternative visitation
schedule would not work and therefore would unreasonably
burden his or her relationship with the child.307
In evaluating the effect of removal, the New Jersey courts
look at the reality that the noncustodial parent is free to remove
him or herself in order to seek an improved and better life, even
though the child remains behind. 3 8 In this situation, the custo-
dial parent could not prevent the noncustodial parent from relo-
cating by claiming the child is being deprived of his or her right
to visit with the noncustodial parent.30 9 Therefore, New Jersey
law provides that the custodial parent should be entitled to seek
out the same opportunities through removal that are available
to the noncustodial parent, providing parental interest can still
be accommodated, even though the visitation schedule may be
different.3 10 The New Jersey courts also consider the preference
of the children, if they are of suitable age, 31' whether there will
be extended family in the new location,31 2 remarriage, 3 3 educa-
tion,314 and employment.315
B. Illinois
Illinois also sets forth its relocation standards by statute
and case law. The courts hold that the custodial parent's desire,
per se, to move to another state is not sufficient without a fur-
ther showing that the move would be in the child's best inter-
est.316 The burden of proving that the move is in the child's best
best interests. Id. at 71-72. The court placed the benefits of the children above the
visits with the noncustodial parent. Id. at 72.
307. Cooper, 491 A.2d at 614; Winer, 575 A.2d at 522; Harris, 563 A.2d at 72.
308. Holder, 544 A.2d at 857; Cooper, 491 A.2d at 613; Helentjaris v. Sudano,
476 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d at 30.
309. Holder, 544 A.2d at 857; Cooper, 491 A.2d at 613; Helentjaris, 476 A.2d
at 832; D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d at 30.
310. Holder, 544 A.2d at 857; Cooper, 491 A.2d at 613; Helentjaris, 476 A.2d
at 832; D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d at 30.
311. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 1993).
312. Holder, 544 A.2d at 854.
313. Harris, 563 A.2d at 71.
314. Holder, 544 A.2d at 854.
315. Id.
316. See, e.g., In re Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (111. 1988); In re Gibbs, 645
N.E.2d 507, 512 (M. App. Ct. 1994); In re Stone, 559 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990); In re Kutinac, 538 N.E.2d 862, 865 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
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interest is placed on the parent seeking removal. 317 In deter-
mining the best interests of the child, the Illinois courts look to
the impact that removal will have on the visitation rights of the
noncustodial parent.318 The courts also look to the policy of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 31 9 which
states that "[t]he court shall presume that the maximum in-
volvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physi-
cal, mental, moral and emotional well-being of their child is in
the best interest of the child."3 20 The burden thus is on the par-
ent seeking removal to show that the move will still promote the
policy of maximum parental involvement. 32'
In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the
courts look at five factors. The first is whether the move is
likely to "[e]nhance the general quality of life for both the custo-
dial parent and the child."322 The second factor requires an ex-
amination of the motives of the custodial parent who wishes to
move, in order to determine whether the motive behind the
move is to defeat or "frustrate" visitation.32 The third factor
the court considers is the noncustodial parent's motives for op-
posing removal.3 24 The fourth factor the court considers is the
noncustodial parent's visitation rights since it is in the best in-
317. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., ch. 750, 5/609 (Michie 1993); Eckert, 518 N.E.2d
at 1044; In re Taylor, 621 N.E.2d 273, 275 (I1. App. Ct. 1993); In re Herkert, 615
N.E.2d 833, 837 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re Pribble, 607 N.E.2d 349, 353 (111. App. Ct.
1993); In re Ballegeer, 602 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); In re Davis, 594
N.E.2d 734, 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
318. In re Bednar, 496 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
319. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., ch. 750, 5/101-5/802 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1994).
320. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 paras. 102(7), 602(c) (recodified as ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN., ch. 750, 5/102, 5/602 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1994)), cited in Bednar, 496
N.E.2d at 1154.
321. In re Shalashnow, 512 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Bednar,
496 N.E.2d at 1154; In re Brady, 450 N.E.2d 985, 986-87 (111. App. Ct. 1983); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 609 (recodified as ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., ch. 750, 5/609
(Michie 1993)).
322. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045; Taylor, 621 N.E.2d at 275; Herkert, 615
N.E.2d at 837; Pribble, 607 N.E.2d at 353; In re Pfeiffer, 604 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992); Ballegeer, 602 N.E.2d at 855; Davis, 594 N.E.2d at 739; In re
Zamarripa-Gesundheit, 529 N.E.2d 780, 782 (fi1. App. Ct. 1988).
323. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045; Taylor, 621 N.E.2d at 275; Zamarripa-Ge-
sundheit, 529 N.E.2d at 782; Winebright v. Winebright, 508 N.E.2d 774, 776 (111.
App. Ct. 1987).
324. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045 (citing D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976)); Davis, 594 N.E.2d at 739; Zamarripa-Gesundheit,
529 N.E.2d at 782.
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terests of the child to have a "healthy and close relationship
with both parents, as well as other family members."325 The
fifth factor is "whether a realistic and reasonable visitation
schedule can be reached if the move is allowed." 326
In Illinois, if the custodial parent can "establish[ ] a good,
sincere reason for wanting to move to another jurisdiction, the
trial court should consider all the relevant factors in determin-
ing the best interest of the child."327 The appellate courts have
stated that there is a presumption favoring the trial court's de-
cision. That presumption is that "[a] trial court's determination
of what is in the best interests of the child should not be re-
versed unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of the
evidence and it appears that a manifest injustice has
occurred."328
VI. The Proposed Test
When a marriage ends, it is because of the inability of the
husband and wife to resolve their differences. Regardless of
whether one party is more at fault, it is the children of the mar-
riage who invariably suffer as a result of their parents' failure.
By creating bright-line rules, such as the "exceptional circum-
stances" test, affecting where, with whom, and how the children
shall live in order to give effect to the parents' rights is to treat
the children as chattel. This is not to say that parental rights
are unimportant. But a court must delicately balance the rights
of the noncustodial parent, the custodial parent, and the child
in resolving relocation disputes. In this triangle, it is the child
who is least able to protect his interests in maintaining a loving,
nurturing relationship with both parents, stability of a home
environment, and continuity of parental care.329
325. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045; Ballegeer, 602 N.E.2d at 854; Zamarripa-
Gesundheit, 529 N.E.2d at 782; Brady, 450 N.E.2d at 987.
326. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045-46; Zamarripa-Gesundheit, 529 N.E.2d at
782.
327. Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046 (citing Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481
N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1985)).
328. Pribble, 607 N.E.2d at 353 (citing Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046); Pfeiffer,
604 N.E.2d at 1071.
329. This is why it is so important that Law Guardians be appointed to pro-
tect the rights of the children involved. See Ladizhensky v. Ladizhensky, 184
A.D.2d 756, 758, 585 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773 (2d Dep't 1992).
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The restrictive view adopted by the courts of New York ig-
nores the fact that the noncustodial parent (usually the father)
is free to move whenever and wherever he wishes, regardless of
the impact it will have on his child.330 Moreover, the relation-
ship is a "joint right" of parent and child,331 and one case has
stressed the need for inquiry into whether the noncustodial par-
ent could relocate to the proposed new domicile of the custodial
parent.33 2 Therefore a more careful inquiry should be made into
the nature and strength of the relationship, including the bond
that existed prior to the divorce, before restricting the right of
the custodial parent to relocate when the move is motivated by
a sincere desire to improve the lifestyle for herself and her
child.
Furthermore, while studies suggest that frequent contact
with the noncustodial parent is beneficial to the child, there are
"two major qualifiers. .. ."3 The first is that heightened levels
of conflict between the divorced parents are detrimental to the
child.334 Secondly, from a common sense perspective, "persis-
330. Very few New York cases have even acknowledged this paradox. But see
In re Michael G., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 1991, at 24 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1991)
(noting that "[n]o cases exist in which a father, custodial parent or not, was denied
the right to move wherever and whenever he pleased. It is the woman who was
asked to submit to the scheduling needs of the child's father."). However, the issue
has been squarely addressed by the New Jersey Superior Court in D'Onofrio v.
D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30-32 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). As one commentator
has noted, in D'Onofrio, the court's "real advantage" test was based on the reason-
ing that the "noncustodial parent's freedom to move... to seek a better life should
be matched by a comparable freedom of a custodial parent to seek a better life,
both personally and for the child, provided that substitute visitation is available."
Peter Ted Surace, A Proposed "Best Interests" Test for Removing a Child from the
Jurisdiction of the Noncustodial Parent, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 507-08 (1982).
Theoretically, a noncustodial parent's right to relocate should also be recognized
only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.
331. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d at 377,380, 436 N.Y.S.2d
at 862, 865 (1981).
332. See Rampolla v. Rampolla, 635 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
333. Robert D. Felner and Lisa Terre, Child Custody Dispositions and Chil-
dren's Adaptation Following Divorce, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETER-
MINATIONS 106, 117 (Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987).
334. Id. at 118. See generally Edythe S. Ellison, Issues Concerning Parental
Harmony and Children's Psychosocial Adjustment, 53 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 73
(Jan. 1983); Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce:
Experiences of the Preschool Child, 14 J. Am. AcAD. CHILD PSYHCHIATRY 600 (1975),
cited in Ellison, supra, at 73.
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tent discord" will most likely have the effect of decreasing visi-
tation over time.335
Naturally, a court cannot be affected by the emotional dis-
cord that often follows its decision. However, we cannot ignore
the potentially damaging effect on the child of increased paren-
tal conflict that must inevitably arise when a custodial parent is
denied permission to move because she cannot meet the techni-
cal burden of proving "exceptional circumstances." It is to be
expected that such a legally imposed restriction on the custodial
parent's freedom will intensify parental hostilities that may al-
ready exist or perhaps even create discord where none existed.
The child may be made to feel responsible for their parents' an-
ger and frustration.
This is especially true when the custodial parent has relied
on a lower court's order allowing such a move. Often, in those
cases, the custodial parent and child have set up a new life
where they may be thriving. But on appeal the permission to
move is revoked and the court mandates that both the parent
and child return to an area within a particular radius of the
noncustodial parent's residence.33 6 Especially in these cases, to
adhere to the absolute presumption that relocation is not in the
child's best interests and disrupt the child's life once again is
contrary to psychological research and is an inflexible way to
approach the difficult questions surrounding custody issues.
For the reasons stated, New York law on relocation should
be changed either by statute, or, more expeditiously, by the
Court of Appeals to reflect the law's expressed primary concern
for the child and to establish guidelines to promote procedural
and substantive consistency. I propose that the exceptional cir-
cumstances test be abandoned since it fails to balance the mul-
titude of factors that should be considered prior to determining
335. See Felner and Terre, supra note 333, at 118.
336. See, e.g., Raybin v. Raybin, 205 A.D.2d 918, 919-20, 613 N.Y.S.2d 726,
727-28 (3d Dept. 1994); Clark v. Dunn, 195 A.D.2d 811, 811-12, 600 N.Y.S.2d 376,
377 (3d Dept. 1993); Leslie v. Leslie, 180 A.D.2d 620, 621, 579 N.Y.S.2d 164, 164
(2d Dep't 1992); Stec v. Levindofske, 153 A.D.2d 310, 313, 550 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968
(4th Dep't 1990). But see Frizzell v. Frizzell, 193 A.D.2d 861, 863, 597 N.Y.S.2d
513, 514 (3d Dept. 1993) (holding that forcing mother and child to return to New
York from California, where the child had "blossomed," and to undergo financial
expense and emotional upheaval, would not be in the child's best interests).
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whether or not a parent should be permitted to relocate or
whether there should be a change of custody to the theretofore
noncustodial parent.
I propose that the test for determining whether a custodial
parent may relocate with the child to a distant domicile be de-
termined in accordance with the following principles:
There shall be no presumptions for or against the proposed
move. The custodial parent desiring to relocate shall bear the
initial burden of coming forward with prima facie evidence that:
(1) the motivation underlying the move is one of good faith
and is not sparked by a desire to interfere maliciously with the
relationship or visitation schedule of the child and noncustodial
parent;
(2) a rational basis exists for believing that the relocation
will provide a better life for the family unit, the parent, or the
child (e.g., a realistic opportunity for a fresh start, a remarriage,
better economic circumstances, career opportunity, educational
advantages, the emotional or practical support of family, etc.);
(3) the child will enjoy a healthy, decent lifestyle in the
new community (i.e., adequate schooling, housing, financial
support);
(4) a proposed visitation program will provide the noncus-
todial parent with sufficient visitation to permit and encourage
the development of a meaningful relationship between the non-
custodial parent and child.
In seeking to oppose the relocation, the noncustodial parent
shall have the burden of disproving by a preponderance of the
evidence, the plaintiff's prima facie case on any of the four fac-
tors above, or that the move will be detrimental to the child.
Thus, the proposed relocation may be defeated by proving that
the purported benefits of the move are not rationally supporta-
ble, or that the deprivation of contact with the noncustodial par-
ent would be so traumatic to the child as to outweigh other
advantages. If no genuine issues of fact are raised by the party
opposing relocation, the court shall permit the relocation to pro-
ceed without a hearing.337 If such issues of fact are raised and
337. David W. v. Julia W., 158 A.D.2d 1, 8, 557 N.Y.S.2d 314, 319 (1st Dep't
1990).
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after a hearing the noncustodial parent fails to sustain the bur-
den on any of those issues, the relocation may proceed. In the
event the noncustodial parent sustains the required burden,
then, the court should continue the best interest hearing to de-
termine whether or not, considering all of the circumstances,
the child should be permitted to move with the custodial parent,
or whether custody should be changed to the noncustodial
parent.
This change in the law will eliminate the rigidity that has
produced inconsistent and inequitable determinations. By re-
moving the exceptional circumstances test and providing more
discretion in the nisi prius courts, the litigation of relocation
cases should diminish and the detrimental effects of forced re-
turns to the former matrimonial domicile following reversal of
trial court determinations should be ameliorated.
The proposed formula requires the courts to consider all
relevant factors and bestows upon the courts the greatest dis-
cretion and flexibility to equitably deal with cases where there
is genuine opposition to the move. A move will be allowed, or
not, because it has been demonstrated that it is, or it is not, in
the child's best interests. Exceptional circumstances will not
pose a threshold, nor will there be a presumption against relo-
cation. If the child's best interests will be served by a reloca-
tion, a move will be allowed. If not, the move will be enjoined.
This approach takes into consideration the needs of the
modern-day custodial parent. Gone are the days of permanent
alimony, and lifetime maintenance is also less frequently
awarded-since today, the focus is on making the dependent
spouse self-sufficient. 33 The fact is that custodial parents must
support themselves, and at the same time, bear a greater bur-
den in raising the children. The custodial parent pays a pro
rata share of the child's support33 9 and is primarily responsible
for the resident children's emotional, psychological and physical
338. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1995). See also
Harmon v. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d 98, 108, 578 N.Y.S.2d 897,902-03 (1st Dep't 1992);
Sperling v. Sperling, 165 A.D.2d 338, 340, 567 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539-40 (2d Dep't
1991).
339. See Child Support Standards Act, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(b)(f) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1995); N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 413(1)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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needs. Given the comparatively greater burden borne by the
custodial parent, and the potential impact upon the children, it
is in the best interest of the child and also, only fair, to permit
and encourage custodial parents to obtain the best possible
lifestyle for both themselves and their children.
The proposed change in the law does not disparage the po-
tential significance of the role of the father (more typically the
noncustodial parent) in the child's emotional or cultural devel-
opment. Indeed, notable among the most dramatic changes in
our social fabric is the fact that as mothers have joined the
workforce, bearing responsibility for their own support and that
of their children, fathers have become far more actively and in-
timately involved in daily parenting duties, starting at the very
beginning, by their presence in Lamaze classes and in birthing
and delivery rooms. The flexibility implicit in the recommended
approach to relocation cases permits the courts to weigh the rel-
ative importance to the child of such close relationships with
the noncustodial parent against all other factors in determining
whether to permit the move, alter visitation or even change cus-
tody. The basic change proposed is not a matter of preference
between fathers and mothers, but rather one of focus on the
child considering all factors impacting upon that child's best in-
terest unimpeded by rigid preconditions.
VII. Conclusion
Just as "[tihe only absolute in the law governing custody of
children is that there are no absolutes,"34° there is no formula or
criteria that will ensure an equitable balancing of the interests
of parents and children in relocation cases or ensure that the
best interests of the children are protected. The best that the
law can do is recognize the reality of the tensions that inher-
ently exist, and to provide such guidance and flexibility as will
enable the trial courts to render determinations to protect the
most vulnerable, innocent parties-the children.
In the final analysis, however, neither geographic proxim-
ity of child to parent, nor any visitation program, will ensure or
340. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767,
447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982).
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even encourage a positive relationship between the child and
parent, or the healthy development of the child, absent a decent
level of communication and good faith between the parties. The
principles underlying the proposed approach to relocation cases
are intended to focus on the child's interests and thereby en-
courage a cooperative attitude between the parents. While the
courts cannot mandate cooperation or good faith, they, as well
as the bar, can encourage the development of those attitudes in
the course of litigation by emphasizing the effect of the parents'
behavior upon the child and by participating in court-related
educational programs offered to parents embroiled in custody
disputes which encourage and facilitate the greater under-
standing and cooperation that ultimately benefits the children,
the parties, and the system.341
A custody or relocation decision is a critical step in the
child-of-divorce's tentative, even perilous journey toward ma-
turity. That child will be required to divide his or her life be-
tween parents without benefit of the comfort and security of an
intact family. The child should not be required to serve as a
bridge between them, or be tossed into the tumultuous sea of
resentment, anger, and discontent that flows too frequently
from their divorce. Following that critical court order are inevi-
table and unforeseeable changes in the needs and circum-
stances of all concerned, that no court can be expected to
anticipate. The court may be "parens patriae" of the child, but
it is obviously no substitute for the parents who must ulti-
341. In New York, Parent Education and Custody Effectiveness (P.E.A.C.E.)
has conducted pilot parent educational programs in a number of communities, in-
cluding Westchester, Erie, Orange, Nassau, Brooklyn, and Albany. In addition,
the Dutchess County Family Court has organized a similar parent education pro-
gram. Preliminary results from these pilot programs find that they encourage di-
vorcing and separating parents to control their hostility towards each other and
focus on the welfare of their children by providing information, encouraging sensi-
tivity to the child's perspective, and offering referrals to helpful community re-
sources. This feedback suggests that divorcing and separating parents welcome
information and support to help structure their post-divorce relationships for the
benefit of their children. Indeed, some states have mandated that parents attend
similar educational programs as part of the divorce process. See Andrew
Schepard, War and P.EA.C.E.: A Preliminary Report and a Model Statute on an
Interdisciplinary Educational Program for Divorcing and Separating Parents, 27
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131 (1993).
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mately provide the continuum of care and flexibility required to
accommodate growth and change. It is clear, therefore, that the
children of New York are not likely to cease being victimized by
the disruption and relocation of their parents' lives, until both
the law of relocation and their parents truly focus on the chil-
dren's best interests above all other concerns.
51
